Liked Arguments from Nature |
UCLA
Professor Eugene Volokh, et alii coniurati, recently received the imprint of
the Washington Post for their important libertarian law blog, The Volokh
Conspiracy. Volokh’s recent salvo against the naturalness of heterosexual,
monogamous marriage will no doubt ingratiate him to his new more liberal
readership.
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Volokh criticizes a Liberty Counsel press release, entitled “Virginia AG abandons natural marriage.” Volokh writes: “Really? What is so natural about exclusively
one-man-one-woman marriage, as opposed to polygamy …?” Volokh proceeds to argue
that because (a) polygamy is historically common behavior, and (b) naturalness
consists of common behavioral patterns, so therefore, (c) polygamy is natural.
Volokh’s
argument has all the force of a response to the Declaration of Independence which
denied that the Laws of Nature entitle any people to independence because many
people have, in nature, been denied independence. That is, Volokh’s argument does
not even engage the position it opposes.
Those,
like Jefferson or Liberty Counsel, who press the idea of “natural” as a guide to
behavior plainly do not reduce nature to regular physical behaviors, as Volokh
does. They speak of “the natural” normatively rather than descriptively. For
example, to say that a car, according to its nature, transports people safely
from place to place does not mean that cars crashes are not among the most
frequent causes of serious injuries in modern society. It means that it is not
in keeping with a car’s nature that they injure people when they are made in
order to transport them safely. When Jefferson says that natural law entitles
the colonies to independence, he makes no comment on whether most colonies have
historically been afforded independence. He says something about the purpose
for which governments exist among men. And, when a natural-law advocate says
that man is not naturally polygamous or adulterous, he makes no necessary comment
on whether men frequently have had multiple wives or cheated on their spouses.
He says it is not in keeping with being a man to do so.
Volokh
concludes “… the important point is that choosing what sorts of relationships
to legally recognize as ‘marriage’ is a matter of social choice, not a ‘natural’
or ‘ontological’ matter.” Showing that marriage laws have varied, as Volokh
does, says nothing about whether the shape of marriage law is merely a matter
of social choice. Laws have varied on almost every subject, but this does not
license us to reduce their shape to a mere matter of social choice. Does Volokh
think that all the historic variations in the law of life, liberty and property
makes all such issues mere matters of social choice? I don’t believe he does.
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